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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the impact of fiscal space on the probability that the government
of Indonesia will be able to implement counter-cyclical fiscal behavior. We use ordinary
least squares and probit methods to estimate the fiscal policy reaction function.
This study confirms that increasing fiscal space can increase the probability of the
government to execute its counter-cyclical behavior policy. A proposal to increase the
space includes generating alternative sources of government revenues from taxes and
non-taxes and redesigning subsidies toward selected targeting recipients to reduce the
non-discretionary part of the government budget.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our main objective is to determine whether fiscal policy is pro-cyclical or countercyclical during the period 2001-2019. In addition, this study aims to identify
whether fiscal space (as a flexible and non-binding component of expenditure)
induces pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical fiscal behavior. If fiscal space positively
influences counter-cyclical behavior, the government must maintain sufficient
fiscal space to generate this specific behavior. The study is essential since empirical
research confirms that fiscal policy is necessary to maintain economic stability.
The fiscal crisis that caused the public debt default in several member states of the
European Union (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus) has proven
the importance of fiscal management. In 2009, Japan also experienced a debt crisis
when it reached twice its GDP.
Our study is motivated by the fact that Indonesia initiated fiscal reforms in
2001 to accommodate fiscal decentralization and increase budget security. The
Government of Indonesia has increased budget allocations for education, health,
and poverty safety nets. The State Finances Act of 2003 obligatates the allocation of
20% of total government expenditures to education and 5% to health. In addition,
there is a budget component that must be transferred to provinces, cities, districts,
and villages. The transfers are respectively classified as Balance Fund, Regional
Incentive Fund, Special Autonomy Fund, Special Status, and various Village
Funds. The government must set a threshold for the budget deficit and public
debt at a maximum of 3% and 60% per GDP. On top of the mandatory spendings,
the government must allocate some funds to obligatory expenditures, including
contracts and operations, such as personnel expenditures, interest payments, debt
repayments, and subsidies. These expenditure components reduce the flexibility of
the government budget for its counter-cyclical policy. The implementation of this
counter-cyclical policy is crucial since it manages the business cycle. Furthermore,
research on fiscal space is important for measuring Indonesia’s fiscal resilience.
However, research into this matter that covers Indonesia does not exist.
Hubbard et al. (2012) define two types of fiscal policy: Discretionary fiscal
policy and automatic stabilizers. Ideally, they are both counter-cyclical. However,
according to Kaminsky et al. (2004) and Magud (2008), budgetary behavior is
not always counter-cyclical and at sometimes it is also pro-cyclical. According to
Lane (2003), counter-cyclical behavior is characterized by a surplus fiscal balance
(contractive fiscal policy) when the output gap is positive and by a deficit balance
(expansive fiscal policy) when the output gap is negative.
The government needs a financial reserve as fiscal space to carry out countercyclical policies, especially when the economy is below the potential output.
Fiscal space is the availability of funds in the government budget that allows
the government to provide funds for a purpose without causing problems in the
government’s financial position (Ghosh et al., 2013; Romer and Romer, 2019). A
high amount of fiscal space makes the budget flexible so that it provides sufficient
funds for emergency purposes, including fiscal stimulus during a recession. If
fiscal space is not available, the government uses debt. However, excessive debt
is harmful to fiscal sustainability since it might increase the deficit ratio above
the mandatory thresholds of 3 percent for several periods. A study by Ko (2020)
on 17 welfare states has established the relation between fiscal space and fiscal
sustainability.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/6
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The potential of fiscal policy to affect the economy is determined by its ability
to control the business cycle due to external and internal shocks (see Afonso and
Sousa, 2012; Fetai, 2017). McKay and Reis (2016) explain that fiscal policy can
moderate the adverse effects of extreme economic fluctuations by encouraging
economic growth during a recession and preventing overheating during
expansion. Corden (2011) states that Counter-cyclical fiscal policy reduces crisis
risk. Furthermore, a study by Rizvi et al. (2021) finds that fiscal policy affects the
economy in the short run through its effect on the stock market in four major
ASEAN countries.
Nerlich and Reuter (2016) and Aizenman et al. (2019) state that the ability
of a country to accumulate fiscal space is a crucial factor that determines fiscal
behavior (pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical fiscal behavior). The mandatory policy is
a constraint for a country to collect fiscal space that can be used when the economy
is down (Schick, 2009).  
The fiscal space is a concept used to measure the government’s flexibility in
allocating the budget for discretionary purposes. Nerlich and Reuter (2016) and
Aizenman et al. (2019) found that the relatively high availability of fiscal space
could shape counter-cyclical fiscal behavior in various countries. Schick (2009)
defines fiscal space as the availability of a government’s financial resources in the
budget to implement a policy (Schick, 2009). Ghosh et al. (2013) also explain that
fiscal space is the availability in the budget that allows the government to provide
funds for a purpose without causing problems to the government’s financial
position. According to Romer and Romer (2019), the ability of a country’s budget
to make (discretionary) expenditures depends on the availability of fiscal space.
However, although many studies examine the relationship between them, no
study has so far examined the role of fiscal space to increase the probability of the
government applying counter-cyclical policy.
Schick (2009) found that the mandatory component in public expenditure was
increasing and relatively dominant. As a result, it reduced fiscal space in OECD
member countries over the period 1960 to 2000. Furthermore, Aizenman et al.
(2019) consider data for developed and developing countries over the perid 1960
to 2016 and found a negative relationship between the public debt to tax base
ratio and the accumulation of fiscal space. The tax revenues are primarily used
to pay state debt so that it limits the country’s ability to accumulate fiscal space.
Therefore, the government continues to increase taxes regardless of the business
cycle. The situation makes fiscal behavior tend to be pro-cyclical, particularly,
during an economic downturn.
This study contributes to the literature in following ways. The estimation
model is constructed based on the fiscal reaction function, which in turn is based
on the intertemporal government budget constraint model. This study measures
the fiscal space in state expenditure, which is different from research conducted
by Nerlich and Reuter (2016) and Aizenman et al. (2019). This study defines fiscal
space as the ratio of total expenditure minus the mandatory component to total
state expenditure. The policy is defined as expansionary if the actual deficit budget
is above the average deficit and as contractionary if the deficit budget is below
the average deficit. A two-step estimation procedure using ordinary least square
(OLS) and probit model has been employed for this purpose.
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022
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The research uses the output gap, fiscal balance per GDP, public debt to GDP,
and fiscal space over the period 2001 to 2019. Using a two-step procedure, this
study has established the existing pro-cyclical fiscal policy in Indonesia and the
role of fiscal space in implementing counter-cyclical fiscal policies. The result
implies that the government must maintain the fiscal space to make the budget
flexible and, therefore, increase the government’s probability to influence the
economy using a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. This study has also performed a
robustness test involving various variables and functions to determine whether the
variables affect budgetary behavior. The result of the robustness test indicates that
the conclusion drawn by the best functions can be used to explain fiscal behavior.
This paper is organized in the following manner. Section II explains the data
and specifies the empirical model while Section III explains the preliminary
analysis of the data. Section IV discusses the main findings. Section V concludes
the study.
II. DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
A. Model Specification
This study uses intertemporal government budget constraints to observe fiscal
behavior in policies controlling the economic cycle (for reference, see Polito and
Wickens, 2005; Bohn, 2007; Hubbard et al., 2014: Ch.15; Asiama et al., 2014, and
Insukindro, 2018). This model adopts a simple intertemporal government budget
constraint model, which can be explained using the following equation:
(1)
The left side of Equation (1) represents government spending, and the right
side represents government revenue. Government spending consists of the
government’s expenditure on goods and services (G), transfer payments (TR) and
interest payments (iB). The right-hand side of Equation (1) stands for the sources
of government revenue, namely revenue from tax (T), new issuance of government
bonds (ΔB) and grants (H). Furthermore, the budget deficit (DF) can be written as
follows:
(2)
The left side of Equation (2) is a budget deficit. The deficit can also be formulated
as:
(3)
The substitution of Equation (3) into Equation (2) will result into the following:
(4)
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/6
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Furthermore, the reaction function can be arranged based on the intertemporal
budget constraint as follows:
(5)
The reaction function which is used as a counter-cyclical policy will accommodate
the output shock as shown in the following model:
(6)
where

is the output gap. Equation (6) can be rewritten as follows:

(7)
where SFt is the surplus budget. Equations (6) and (7) show that the counter-cyclical
fiscal policy responds to the reduction of the output gap by increasing the deficit
budget (or decreasing the surplus budget). Coefficients -α3 and β3 imply that the
fiscal policy behaves in a counter-cyclical way.
In this study, counter-cyclical and pro-cyclical behavior are categorized based
on the combination of the output gap, positive or negative, and type of policy,
expansionary or contractionary. The policy is classified as pro-cyclical fiscal policy
when the output gap is positive (or negative), in which case the government
adopts the expansionary (or contractionary) fiscal policy. Furthermore, the policy
is categorized as a counter-cyclical policy when the output gap is positive (or
negative). In that case, the government adopts the contractionary (or expansionary)
fiscal policy. Table 1 describes the categories of budgetary behavior.
Table 1.
Fiscal Behavior
This table presents details regarding Indonesia’s fiscal behavior.

Fiscal Policy

Expansive
Output Gap
Contractive

Contractionary

Expansionary

Counter-cyclical
Output gap expansive
Contractionary fiscal policy
(III) Pro-cyclical
Output gap contractive
Contractionary fiscal policy

Pro-cyclical
Output gap expansive
Expansionary fiscal policy
Conter-cyclical
Output gap contractive
Expansionary fiscal policy

The average output gap (closer to zero) is used during the period as the limit
of output are categorized as expansion or contraction. Furthermore, the average
value of fiscal budget (deficit or surplus) per GDP is used as the critical limit to
determine whether the policy is expansionary or contractionary. The output gap
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022
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value and the value of fiscal budget must be normally distributed so that their
average can be employed as a critical limit. For this reason, it is necessary to carry
out normality tests.
Fiscal behavior can be arranged as pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical using the
information presented in Table 1. Furthermore, fiscal space can be included in
Equation (7) to develop a model that measures the effect of fiscal space and the
change of public debt on the probability of government’s fiscal policy to shift to a
counter-cyclical policy. Therefore, the model can be specified as follows:
(8)
where rf is fiscal space per GDP and ∆bt stands for the change of public debt per
GDP.
B. Data
This study uses quarterly time series data over the period 2001:Q1 to 2019:Q4. Our
data starts from 2001 because Indonesia had carried out fiscal reforms in 2001 to
fix the state budget due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Table 2 presents detail
information of all variables used in this study. The business cycle is measured by
way of the output gap, i.e. the difference between actual and potential output.
When the economy expands, the actual output is greater than the potential output.
During contraction, the actual output is below the potential output1. Changes in
the expansion (prosperity) and contraction (recession) of the output gap over time
are known as business (economic) cycle.
The fiscal balance is the gap between government revenue and expenditure. If
the budgetary balance is positive, the revenue is greater than the expenditure or
a surplus budget. Conversely, a negative fiscal balance means that the revenues
are smaller than the expenditures amounting to a deficit budget. Meanwhile, the
fiscal balance ratio is the fiscal balance divided by GDP. The constant price of 2010
is consistently used.
The budget deficit financing is used for the constant price of 2010 to measure
the change of state debt. Meanwhile, the budget deficit financing divided by
GDP is used as a ratio of the debt change per GDP. Moreover, fiscal behavior is
defined as counter-cyclical behavior or pro-cyclical behavior. A dummy variable
is employed to quantify the fiscal behavior with category value one while its
behavior is counter-cyclical and zero while it is pro-cyclical.

1

GDP is used at a constant price to measure the actual output because the constant GDP reflects actual
economic conditions (Cimadomo, 2012). According to Lane (2003), a positive output gap indicates
high aggregate demand and production above its potential level. A positive output gap results
in over-employment and increasing the price level (inflation). However, the negative output gap
reflects the production as being below optimal, which results in rising unemployment. Fiscal policy
is applied to avoid these extreme conditions (Cimadomo, 2012; Kaminsky et al., 2004).
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Table 2.
Variable Description
This table reports detail description of all variables used in this study. We use deflator GDP constant price 2010. Our
data is sourced from Statistical center bureau of Indonesia (BPS) and Ministry of Finance (MoF). The potential GDP is
estimated using Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter.

Variable

Sign

Explanation

Sources

Real output

Y

(BPS)

Output gap

ŷ

BPS

Fiscal balence

SF

Fiscal balance to
GDP ratio

sf

SFt>0 : surplus budget; SFt<0 : deficit budget
Constant price 2010
T: Tax revenue; H: revenue from Grant; G: expenditure;
TR: transfer payment; iB: interest and principal payment
of loan.
Fiscal balance (surplus or deficit) to GDP ratio

(MoF)

MoF
sft>0 : surplus budget; sft<0 : deficit budget

The change of
public debt

∆B

The change of
public debt to GDP
ratio

∆b

Deficit financing

MoF

The change of public debt to GDP ratio

Fiscal space

rf

Fiscal behavior

PF

MoF
Ratio of the non-binding component of state expenditure
divided by total state expenditure

MoF

Dummy variable:
Countercyclical fiscal policy: 1
Procyclical fiscal policy: 0

This study defines fiscal space as the ratio of the non-binding component of
state expenditure divided by total state expenditure. We use the classification of
expenditures based on the scopes (explicit and implicit) and obligations (direct
and contingent) that have been proposed by Brixi and Mody (2002). Table 3 shows
four categories of state expenditures. (1) Explicit liabilities are regulated based
on laws and regulations (mandatory by law), while (2) implicit liabilities are the
moral obligations of the government to the community. (3) Direct liabilities are the
obligation that have already been planned, while (4) contingent liabilities can arise
unexpectedly. Components (1) and (2) of state expenditures are urgent because
they are mandatory by law. Meanwhile, the components (3) and (4) of state
expenditures are based on moral obligations to the citizens, which, if not fulfilled,
will have political implications. Furthermore, the expenditure components (1)
and (3) are categorized as bound expenditures. The higher the components 1 and
3, the lower the accumulation of fiscal space, which causes a limited budget to
accommodate uncertainty.
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022
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Table 3.
Types of Government Expenditure
Sources of
Obligations

Direct Liabilities

Contingent Liabilities

Explicit

Direct explicit liabilities
Expenditure composition (nondiscretionary spending)

Contingent explicit liabilities
State guarantees for non-sovereign borrowing
by and other obligations of sub-national
government and public and private
sector entities, state guarantees on private
investments

Implicit

Direct implicit liabilities
Future public pensions, social security
schemes

Contingent implicit liabilities
Environmental recovery, banking failure

Source: Brixi and Mody (2002, p. 23 & 26)

C. Estimation Method
We perform the following procedure to estimate the specific fiscal behavior. The
first stage is the stationarity test using the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) unit root test (with and without breaks). These tests were carried out to
determine whether the variables were stationary at level I (0) or first difference I
(1). If the variable is stationary at I (0), the fiscal reaction function (Equation 7) is
estimated using the OLS method. However, if it is stationary at I (1), using the OLS
will produce spurious regression results (see Gujarati and Porter, 2009: 762). The
data is said to be stationary if at least one test out of the five assumptions states
that the variables are stationary. The fiscal policy reaction function is estimated
using the OLS method if all variables are stationary. Finally, we test whether
there are problems of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, non-normal, and nonstationary of residual. The estimation results will show whether the fiscal policy
is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. Moreover, the residual test provides additional
information about fiscal policy behavior.
At the second stage, a fiscal reaction function is estimated with the dependent
variable being policy behavior, pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical (see Equation
8). When the fiscal behavior is pro-cyclical, the value is zero, and it is value one
when fiscal behavior is counter-cyclical. The data are categorized as pro-cyclical
if the output gap and fiscal policy move in the same direction. If the output gap
is expansive (contractive), the fiscal policy is expansionary (contractionary). The
data are categorized as counter-cyclical if the output gap and fiscal policy move
in opposite direction. If the output gap is expansive (contractive), the fiscal policy
is contractionary (expansionary). The average of the output gap is set as a critical
limit to determine whether the economy is expansive or contractive. The average
fiscal budget is also set as a critical limit to determine whether the fiscal policy
is expansionary or contractionary. Jarque Bera (JB) normality test is employed
to determine whether the data is normally distributed. The average value of
the variable can be employed as a critical limit as long as the data is normally
distributed.
The fiscal reaction function (8) is estimated using the probit method. The
probit method is employed to find the effect of changes in the debt to GDP ratio,
∆bt, and the fiscal space to GDP, rft, on the probability of the government carrying
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/6
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v25i2

8

Putri et al.: THE IMPACT OF FISCAL SPACE ON INDONESIA’S FISCAL BEHAVIOR
The Impact of Fiscal Space on Indonesia’s Fiscal Behavior

243

out a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The negative sign of coefficient ∆bt indicates
that the increase in ∆bt causes the decrease in the probability of the government’s
implementation of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The positive coefficient of
rft suggests that the increase in rft causes the increase in the probability of the
government’s implementation of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Hendry’s general
to a specific approach has been adopted to choose the lag of variables2.
III. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Mandatory components in the state expenditure of Indonesia are constrained
by law and contract. The laws that regulate the state budget include Law No.
20/2003 on the National Education System stating that the education expenditure
must be 20 percent of the total state expenditure. Law No. 36/2009 concerning
Health obligates that expenditure on health must be five percent of the total
expenditure. Law No.33/2004 on Fiscal Decentralization regulates that percentage
share of the domestic revenue to regions; Law No. 11/2006 and Law No. 35/2008
concerning the Special Autonomy Fund for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province,
Papua Province, and West Papua Province that each will receive two percent from
the General Allocation Fund of applicable provinces; Law No. 13/2012 concerning
the Special Region of Yogyakarta regulates the Special Regional Fund; Law No.
6/2014 regarding Village Funds regulates that 10 percent of the Balanced Fund must
be allocated to districts or cities in the State Budget minus the Special Allocation
Fund. Law 17/2003 concerning State Finances regulates that the maximum ratio
deficit/GDP must be three percent, and the ratio of the public debt per GDP is 60
percent. State expenditures are also bounded by contracts and operations of state
administration, such as personnel expenditures, principal and interest payment of
public debt, and subsidies. Table 4 shows the expenditure component in 2012 as an
example. It shows that the mandatory component includes personnel expenditure,
interest and principal payment, subsidies, social assistance, and transfers to the
region and rural funds. The mandatory element for 2012 is 78.97 percent in the
budget. Consequently, 21.03 percent is the fiscal space.
Table 5 presents detail description of variables, namely output gap (ŷt), the
change of public debt (∆Bt), the change of public debt per GDP (∆bt), the budget
surplus per GDP (SFt), the primary surplus per GDP (sft), and the fiscal space (rft).
The 2010 constant price is used for ∆Bt and SFt. The mean quarterly output gap (ŷ)
is nearly zero and normally distributed. The probability of the JB-test is higher
than α=5%. With a normal data distribution, the mean can be employed as a limit
to determine the expansion or contraction of the economy, ŷt=0.

2

For this procedure see Campos et al. (2005), page 3.
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Table 4.
2012 Expenditure Components
In this table, authors have computed Indonesia expenditure components using 2012 data.

State Expenditure (I+II)
I. Central Government Expenditures
a.
Personnel expenditures
b.
Goods expenditures
c.
Capital expenditures
d.
Interest
e.
Subsidies
f.
Other expenditures
g.
Grants
h.
Social assistance
II. Transfer to Region and Rural Funds
Shortage due to rounding
Mandatory spending-to-state expenditure (%)
Mandatory spending: a+d+e+h+II*

100.000
67.758
13.267
9.446
9.729
6.740
23.228
0.273
0.005
5.070
32.228
0.014
78.97

Source: Authors’ calculation

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/6
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Frequency
Obs.
unit
Mean
Median
Max.
Min.
Sta. dev.
JB-stat.
Prob.

∆Bt

76
Billion Rp
37088.5
37422.0
189742.9
-33928.7
37062.7
30.574
0.000

ŷt

76
%
0.004
-0.241
2.995
-3.068
1.702
4.251
0.119

76
%
2.227
1.962
18.151
-2.577
2.742
665.480
0.000

∆bt

sft

Quarterly
76
%
-1.562
-1.565
5.776
-7.237
2.182
5.061
0.080
76
%
0.671
0.863
7.513
-5.783
2.615
0.405
0.817

spt
76
%
12.917
11.605
38.600
3.520
6.595
20.888
0.000

rft
76
Billion Rp
-29488.2
-18691.3
85633.6
-149492.0
43461.0
3.596
0.166

SFt
19
Billion Rp
-136292.7
-84399.4
-4121.2
-348646.3
124967.0
2.346
0.310

SFt

sft

Yearly
19
%
-1.607
-1.752
-0.083
-2.590
0.745
4.402
0.111

19
%
0.626
0.589
3.514
-1.236
1.358
0.926
0.629

spt

This table reports descriptive statistics, namely mean, median, maximum (Max.) and minimum (Min.) values, and standard deviation (St. dev.). of variables used in this study. In the
final two rows, we have reported Jarque–Bera test results which examines the null hypothesis of normal distribution. All variables are defined in Table 2.

Table 5.
Descriptive Statistics
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The average quarterly sft is -1.562, and with α=5 percent, thus, the data
distribution can be considered normal. With normal data distribution, the
average of -1.562 can be employed as the limit to determine the expansionary or
contractionary fiscal policy. Based on this limit, the government’s behavior at a
given time will be pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical.
Additionally, data presented in Table 5 show that, in general, fiscal policy is
a deficit. The SFt, has a quarterly average of IDR -29,488 billion and an annualy
average IDR -136,292 billion. Both have an α of five percent indicating a normal
distribution. Meanwhile, the value of sft amounts to -1.562 and -1.607 percent,
which also shows that fiscal policy is generally in deficit. The distribution of the
fiscal balance (surplus balance) data per GDP with an α of 5 percent indicates a
normal distribution. The normal distribution of data shows that expansionary or
contractionary fiscal policy is carried out in a balanced way by the government to
control the output gap, which is also normally distributed. The maximum annual
deficit per GDP is 2.59 percent or surplus -2.59 percent, meaning that it does not
violate the limit of deficit per GDP which is three percent in one fiscal year even
though quarterly deficit per GDP can exceed three percent, with the highest deficit
per GDP value amounting to 7.24 percent. Figure 1 plots that the quarterly and
annual deficit per GDP during the period 2001-2019. The plot indicates that even
if there is a limit to the deficit regulation, the government can still use the fiscal
balance to control the business cycle.
Figure 1.
Output Gap and Deficit-to-GDP Ratio
We use left scale for quarterly output gap and quarterly balance badget per GDP. The right scale is used for yearly
output gap and quarterly balance budget per GDP.
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The annual deficit and annual output gaps indicate pro-cyclical fiscal behavior.
A low fiscal deficit accompanied the decrease in the output gap from 2001-2010.
The rise in the deficit is also followed by the increase in the output gap from 2011https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/6
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v25i2
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2019, which indicates an expansionary budgetary deficit. As for quarterly data, it
is not easy to find patterns of counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical fiscal behavior. The
indications of counter-cyclical behavior can be seen in 2001, 2005-2010, and 20152018. The data show that the government uses its fiscal policy to influence the
output gap.
Other information to be derived from Table 5 is the value of the fiscal
balance by removing the principal and interest payments from the calculation
so that the primary deficit per GDP (spt) is obtained. The average quarterly and
annually primary balance amounts to a surplus of 0.671 and 0.626, respectively.
The distribution of primary balance is normal. This information shows that fiscal
policy is sustainable since the government can pay off its debts and instalments.
The average ∆Bt, and, ∆bt, were IDR 37,088 billion and 2.227 percent,
respectively. This result confirms the fiscal balance data, which is always in deficit.
The non-normal distribution of ∆Bt and ∆bt indicates that the deficit financing
policy rose and came across as being non-uniform, adjusted for the shortage of
state revenues to finance expenditures.
Figure 2.
Components of State Expenditure, 2001-2019
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Furthermore, Figure 2 shows the trend of the ratio of binding expenditure
components compared to the total state expenditure. Total spending binds use
the scale on the right while others use the one on the left. In general, there is a
downward trend in government binding spending from 2001-2019. This decrease
was driven by reducing the subsidy component and payment of interest on debt
and instalments. The reduction of the fuel subsidy itself began in 2005 by limiting
the provision of subsidies to only three types of fuel, namely premium, diesel, and
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kerosene. Overall, in 2014 the fuel and electricity subsidies were abolished, and
only given to homes with electricity power up to 450VA and 900VA. In addition, the
government has implemented a fiscal rule that limits the maximum loan amount
to 60% of GDP so that the amount of debt interest payments and instalments can
be reduced. The decision to restrict energy subsidy to selected households reduces
the portion of the subsidy in total government expenditures. The proceeds derived
from subsidy reduction can be used to finance other government programs.
Figure 2 shows an increase in personnel expenditure, transfer of funds to
the regions and village (rural) funds, and social assistance. Several government
policies offer evidence that the government’s fiscal reforms increase the
composition of binding expenditure in the budget. Indonesia has implemented
a fiscal decentralization policy since 2001. The central government is delegating
authority (except in foreign policy, defence, religious affairs, security, judiciary,
and monetary and fiscal policies), including the transfer of funds from the center
to the regions. The policy aims to reduce the regional gap (horizontal imbalances)
and the center and areas (vertical imbalances). The government implemented a socalled hold harmless or indemnity (waiver of liability) system until 2008 to ensure
that the regions received the General Allocation Fund (DAU). The latter was more
significant than or amounted to the same as the previous year. However, the hold
harmless system does not minimize disparities between regions but makes the
burden of binding state expenditures increase sharply. Figure 2 shows that the
transfer of funds to the regions and village (rural) funds holds the highest portion
of the total government expenditures, and the part is increasing, indicating
increasing fiscal autonomy for regional governments.
The following policy, social safety net programs, such as Direct Cash Assistance
(BLT) in 2005 and 2008 and the Family Hope Program (PKH) in 2007 aimed to
help communities, predominantly low-income people, that had been affected by
the fuel price increase and the global financial crisis. The Healthy Indonesia Card
(KIS) and the Smart Indonesia Card (KIP) are part of PKH so that the community
can access health and education facilities. In addition, the village fund, initiated
in 2015, increases biding expenditure in the government budget. According to the
Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration
(Kemendesa) (2019a), in 2015, the government provided approximately IDR
280.3 million per village with an absorption rate of 82.72 percent per village and
continued to increase this sum until 2018, namely to IDR 800.4 million per village
with a higher absorption rate than 2017 (exceeding 98.74 percent). Village funds are
used for several purposes, one of which is to establish Village-Owned Enterprises
(BUMDs) to stimulate the village economy, infrastructure and even improve the
quality of life in the village (Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged
Regions and Transmigration, 2019b)
IV. MAIN FINDINGS
We begin by discussing results reported in Table 6. More specifically, we report
unit root test results in Table 6 and find that all variables used in our study
follows stationary process. Additionally, we employ the Granger causality test to
determine the relationship between the ŷ, and SF and report results in Table 7. We
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/6
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document that the null hypothesis that the output gap does not cause fiscal balance
is rejected, while the hypothesis that fiscal balance does not cause the output gap
is accepted. This implies that the fiscal balance, budget deficit or surplus, is the
government’s reaction to the output gap. The government attempts to balance the
output gap using its deficit or surplus budget policy.
Table 6.
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results
This table reports ADF unit root test results. The null hypothesis examined is that the series contain a unit root. * and
*** denotes statistical significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.

ADF
ADF
Assumption
ŷt
∆Bt
∆bt
SFt
sft

None

Intercept

Intercept &
Trend

-1.4803
-0.3378
-3.2089**
-0.6181
-1.4803

-2.7976
-1.4792
-8.4329**
-1.6170
-2.7975

-3.5145*
-5.9682**
-8.7399**
-3.1301
-3.5145*

ADF with Break Test
Int. & Trend
Intercept
Break: Int. &
Trend
-9.0630**
-12.2021**
-9.4306**
-8.2750**
-8.22997**

-9.0718**
-11.9748**
-9.8944**
-10.0714**
-8.4076**

Tabel 7.
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
This table reports Granger causality test results. We consider lag length of 2 in our test.

Null Hypothesis

F-statistic

Probability

13.4850
1.81727

0.0000
0.1702

ŷt does not Granger Cause SF
SF does not Granger Cause ŷt

Results obtained by estimating Equation (7) are reported in Table 8. Our
tabulated results show that the size of the fiscal balance (deficit or surplus) is
influenced significantly by the previous government debt, ∆Bt-1, and the previous
output gap, ŷt-1. The negative debt coefficient indicates an increase in government
debt is used for the deficit. The estimation results also show that the previous
output gap has a significant negative effect. The negative coefficient of the previous
output gap indicates the pro-cyclical behavior of the government budget. An
increase in the output gap (expansion) will be followed by a deficit policy, while
a contractionary fiscal policy will decrease the output gap (recession). The result
confirms the outcome of the Granger causality test.
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Table 8.
The Estimation of Fiscal Reaction Function
This table reports results obtained from estimating Equation (7). * and ** indicates statistical significance at 5% and
1% levels, respectively.

Independent Variable
∆Bt
∆Bt-1
ŷt
ŷt-1
c

Coefficient
-0.198628
-0.401091*
3169.030
-13107.48*
-14742.29*

Dependent Variable: SF
t-statistic
-1.636664
-2.143927
1.217175
-5.085165
-1.809483

Probability
0.1062
0.0355
0.2276
0.0000
0.0747

R-squared
F-statistic
Durbin-Watson stat.

0.328597
Adjusted R-squared
0.290231
8.564820
Prob(F-statistic)
0.000011
2.021807
ADF-test stat. for Residual
t-statistic
-2.174270
Prob.
0.0295
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey- Null Hypothesis: Homoskedasticity
F-statistic
0.806327
    Prob. F (4,70)
0.5253
Obs*R-squared
3.303475
0.5084
    Prob. Chi-Square (4)
Normality Test for Residual
Jarque-Bera
3.6683
Prob.
0.1597

Additionally, resuls obtained using the Durbin-Watson test shows no
autocorrelation problem in our data. These results indicate that the residuals between
periods are not interrelated. The absence of autocorrelation also demonstrates that
the fiscal deficit is more discretionary than an automatic stabilizer. The current
fiscal policy is not significantly affected by the previous policy. Heteroscedasticity
testing using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test shows a homoscedastic residual as
well. These results indicate that the mean and variance of the residuals do not
vary over the period studied. These results indicate a predictable fiscal policy with
an output gap and changes in debt. There are indications of a disciplined fiscal
rule on the output gap and additional debt. The results of autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity tests have also been confirmed by the stationary residual test.
Moreover, the estimation results show that the residuals are normally distributed.
Furthermore, the dummy of fiscal behavior has been constructed based on the
estimation results of the fiscal reaction function. Each point in Figure 3 combines
the ŷt-1, and the sf. Lag length of one has been selected since the estimation result
of the fiscal reaction function shows that the ŷt-1 is statistically significant. Since the
government policies tend to be in deficit, and it is known that the average fiscal
balance per GDP is -1.56 percent, the vertical zero axis is shifted to -1.56. We built
criteria determining that the fiscal balances below -1.56% are expansionary policy
and above -1.56% are contractionary policy.
Furthermore, the output gap above zero is defined as expansion and below zero
as contraction of the economy. Figure 3 shows that the fiscal balance in quadrants
II and IV are defined as pro-cyclical fiscal behavior. In addition, the fiscal balance
in quadrants I and III is defined as counter-cyclical behavior. Based on Figure 3,
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/6
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a dummy variable is constructed, with value one to indicate a counter-cyclical
policy (output contractive and expansionary fiscal policy; output expansive
and contractionary fiscal fiscal policy) and zero for a pro-cyclical policy (output
expansive and expansionary fifcal policy; output contractive and contractinary
fiscal policy).
Figure 3.
Pro-cyclical and Counter-cyclical Behavior
The cobination negative output gap and balance budget per GDP lower than -1.56 as well as positive output gap and
balance budget per GDP higher than -1,56 are catagorized as counter-cyclical behavior.
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This study employs the probit method to estimate the fiscal behavior reaction
function based on dummy categories and report results in Table 9. The effect of
debt on fiscal behavior in estimating the probit model shows that an increase in
government debt per GDP reduces the probability of the government implementing
a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. This condition is reasonable since there is a state
debt limit to finance the deficit. The statement also is confirmed by a mean value
of ∆bt-1 in the categorical descriptive pro-cyclical category is 2.82 being higher than
the caunter-cyclical one 1.67.
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Table 9.
The Estimation of Fiscal Behavior Reaction Function
This table reports result obtained using a probit model. * and ** indicates statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.

∆bt-1
rft-1
C
McFadden R-squared
LR statistic
Obs with Dep=0
ADF test statistic
Jarque-Bera

Coefficient

Z-statistic

Probability

-0.158336**
0.062971**
-0.458715
0.099451
10.33883
37

-2.233887
2.466889
-1.280159

0.0255
0.0136
0.2005

Prob(LR statistic)
Obs with Dep=1
ADF-test stat. for residual
Prob.
Normality test for residual
Prob.

0.005688
38

-17.44773
3.3030

0.0000
0.1918

Categorical Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables
mean
Obs with Dep=0: 37
Obs with Dep=1: 38
All = 75
∆bt-1
rft-1

2.814854
11.52324

∆bt-1
rft-1

3.373635
6.145243

1.670652
14.47026
Standard Deviation
1.868552
6.745484

2.235125
13.01640
2.759404
6.581994

Furthermore, these results indicate that rft-1 increases the government’s
probability of carrying out a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The mean of categorical
descriptive statistics shows that the mean value of observations in the countercyclical category, 14.47, is greater than the pro-cyclical one, 11.52. This result
indicates that higher fiscal space increases the probability of counter-cyclical fiscal
behavior in the next period.
A. Robustness Check
We have also considered a robustness test which includes various variables,
functions, and tests to determine whether the model and these variables affect
fiscal behavior. More specifically, we use the primary fiscal balance and total fiscal
balance andfound that the estimation using the total fiscal balance better explains
fiscal behavior. The functions have been estimated with other independent
variables, including trade balance, exchange rate volatility, inflation rate, interest
rates, decreased foreign exchange reserves, and capital flows with government
finances3. The current fiscal reaction function is better since none of the variables
affects fiscal behavior. Finally, this study includes different lag lengths of variables
and found that the current model was better.

3

The variables are chosen based on the studies of Bario et al. (2016), Neaime and Gaysset (2017), Tan et
al. (2020).
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study concludes that the government uses fiscal balance (budget deficit or
surplus) to stabilize the output gap. The fiscal deficit is more discretionary than an
automatic stabilizer and there are indications of a disciplined fiscal rule regarding
the output gap and additional debt. The results confirm that the theoretical
prediction that the government manages a discretionary fiscal policy so that fiscal
policy is a form of resilience against shock.
This study finds that the availability of fiscal space as proxied through state
expenditures can increase the possibility of the government carrying out countercyclical fiscal policies in Indonesia. The lower the composition of expenditure
binding to total spending, the higher the accumulation of fiscal space so that the
government is more flexible in implementing counter-cyclical policies. These
results support conclusions made by Nerlich and Reuter (2016) and Aizenman et
al. (2019) 4, that fiscal space influences fiscal behavior.
Fiscal policy has an essential role in maintaining economic stability.
Furthermore, economic stability requires a fiscal policy that is inversely
proportional to the business cycle or counter-cyclical policy. This study shows that
the macroeconomic policy needs adequate fiscal space to fund a fiscal stimulus
package as a form of expansionary fiscal policy when the economy weakens.
A proposal to increase this fiscal space includes generating alternative sources
of government revenues from taxes and non-taxes. Moreover, the composition of
tax revenues from individual income tax should be higher than corporate income
tax. By doing so, the revenues can be less sensitive to the business cycle. Another
proposal is to redesign subsidies toward selected targeting recipients to reduce
the non-discretionary part of the government budget. Subsidies for electricity
and energy should be redesigned accordingly. However, this policy requires an
accurate recipient database to ensure that the subsidies are distributed to those
who need them the most.
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